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Can Ofcom Make a Small Forum Scan Your Private Messages?

In law, yes, on paper; in practice, not today. The Online Safety Act 2023 contains a power for Ofcom to require a service to use "accredited technology" to find certain illegal content, including in private messages. It has no size threshold. But a chain of conditions sits in front of it, and the first link is currently missing.

This is general information, not legal advice. I will separate what the statute says from what Ofcom has said and from my own reading.

Is a small forum even in scope?

Probably, if it has UK users. The Act regulates "user-to-user services": anything where content generated by one user can be encountered by another. A forum with a private messaging feature fits that description easily, however few members it has.

Being in scope mostly means the ordinary duties: illegal content risk assessments, takedown processes, reporting and complaints. Those are the everyday obligations, and they are proportionate to size and risk. They are not scanning.

Where the scanning power lives

The power is in section 121. Ofcom can give a provider a notice requiring it to use accredited technology to identify and take down terrorism content or child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) content. The text covers both public and private communications.

It is a narrow power in two ways:

  • Only two categories of content: terrorism and CSEA.
  • Only technology that meets a minimum standard of accuracy, which the Secretary of State approves on Ofcom's advice.

A related limb lets Ofcom require a provider to make best endeavours to develop or source such technology. That is a heavier ask, and it is exactly what a one-person forum cannot meet.

The hurdles before a notice can land

A notice is the end of a process, not the start of one. As I read the Act, the steps look like this:

  1. Ofcom decides the service falls within the relevant scope.
  2. Ofcom issues a warning notice and gives the provider a chance to respond.
  3. Ofcom must be satisfied that a notice is necessary and proportionate, with regard to the risk and prevalence of the content and the service's size and nature.
  4. The technology must be accredited against the accuracy standard.

Step 4 is where it stalls. Ofcom has said publicly that it cannot currently use the power because no technology has been accredited. During the Bill's passage, ministers also said the power would not be used where suitable technology did not exist. That is a political statement, not a clause, so treat it as context rather than protection.

Quick detour: why accuracy is the whole game

Hang on, why does a mere accuracy standard matter so much? Because of base rates. If a hash-matching or classifier system has a tiny false positive rate, a forum with thousands of benign private messages still produces wrongly flagged ones, and every flag means a human reading somebody's private conversation.

Matching known images by hash is one thing. Classifying new text or images is far less precise. Whether any system can meet a defensible standard on private text conversations is genuinely contested, and that is why the accreditation step is not a formality.

What about encryption?

A typical small forum does not have end-to-end encrypted private messages. Its admin can read them in the database, so scanning on the server is technically feasible. That is a different situation from a messenger like Signal, where scanning would have to happen on the device.

The Act does not mention encryption in the section's wording; the dispute is over what compliance would require. For a plain-text forum, the technical objection is weaker but the legal and privacy ones remain.

The privacy angle for the admin

Even without a notice, an admin who chooses to scan private messages is processing personal data under UK GDPR, and private messages carry a strong expectation of confidentiality. You would need a lawful basis, transparency in your privacy notice, and a case that the scanning is proportionate. The Investigatory Powers Act also has interception rules that bite on reading communications in transit, though an operator monitoring its own system has some room.

This is where I would be cautious: voluntary scanning is not safer than waiting. It creates its own obligations.

What a small operator can sensibly do now

  • Do the illegal content risk assessment, and keep it short and honest.
  • Make reporting and takedown work, including for private message reports from recipients.
  • State in your privacy notice what you do and do not read.
  • Watch Ofcom's register of accredited technology and its published guidance, since the picture changes only when that moves.

My opinion: the power is a lever held in reserve, and its practical effect on small services is mostly the uncertainty. That is a cost in itself, but it is not the same as a live scanning obligation.